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HARRY M. WEENIG and ERMA P. 
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Defendants and 
Appellants. 
* * * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Thi s i s an appea l from the r e f u s a l o f the t r i a l c o u r t 
t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t judgment e n t e r e a a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t in 
February o f 1 9 8 0 . 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
P l a i n t i f f f i l e d an a c t i o n a g a i n s t defendant Harry M. 
Weenig and a p p e l l a n t Erma P . Weenig on J u l y 3 0 , 1979 (R. 2 - 4 ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 19978 
claiming that Harry's conveyance of all of his interest in the 
family home to Erma was fraudulent* The complaint was pur-
portedly served on Mrs* Weenig on August 9, 1979, when, accord-
ing to the constable's return ot service, a copy of the com-
plaint and summons was left with Jane Doe
 # an unidentified per-
son who tne constable stated was a person of suitable age 
residing at the usual place of abode of appellant within the 
meaning of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1)* An amended 
complaint was filed on August 28, 1976 (R. 15-20); no copy of 
that complaint was ever served upon appellant. 
A default judgment was taken against Mrs* Weenig on 
February 6# 1980. (R. 36 & 37). The plaintiff made no attempt 
to enforce this judgment until the Spring of 1984. Appellant 
by affidavit stated that she first learned of the Gefault judg-
ment when her attorney, Clifford V. Dunn, investigated a 
praecipe taped to tne window of her home on April 11 , 1984. 
Six days later, on April 17, 1984, Mrs. Weenig, through coun-
sel, fileo a motion to set aside the default judgment on tne 
ground that process had never been served upon her (R. 44-67). 
The motion to set aside the default judgment was 
thereafter heard by the trial court on May 2, 1984, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Fredrick presiding. After hearing the 
testimony proffered by the parties, the trial court denied 
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appellant's motion (R. 101, 110-118). Appellant thereupon 
filed a notice of appeal on May 7, 1984 (R. 104), and present 
counsel for the appellant filed a protective notice of appeal 
(R. 124-125) on June 26, 1984. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of the 
district court denying her motion to set aside the default 
judgment, and requests that this Court dismiss the action 
against her based on the non-service upon her. Alternatively, 
appellant requests that this Court vacate the judgment against 
appellant and remand this matter to the district court and 
direct that court to permit her to file her answer and hear her 
defenses to the complaint against her. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 30, 1979, Mark Wood, respondent in this 
action, filed a complaint against Harry M. Weenig and appellant 
Erma M. Weenig, his wife, seeking to set aside as fraudulent 
tne transfer by quitclaim deed, nearly three years earlier, of 
all of Harry M. Weenig1 s right, title, and interest in the 
family's residence at 4464 Covecrest Drive, Salt Lake City, 
Utah to appellant (R. 2-4). Appellant contends that this 
transfer was made for goo a ana valuable consideration. Mr. 
-3-
Vtood pursues this action in an effort to collect on a $200,000 
judgment obtained against Harry Weenig over five years earlier 
in an Indiana state court (R. 2), which was later entered as a 
judgment in the Third District Court for the State ot Utah (R. 
22-23). 
The complaint in the fraudulent conveyance action was 
purportedly served upon Mrs. Weenig by delivering a copy of it 
to Jane Doe, the unidentified daugnter of the appellant, at the 
family residence on August 9, 1979 (R. 12). The return of 
service was signed by Frank E. Spriggs, Deputy Constable Murray 
Precinct (R. 12). At the evidentiary hearing on appellant's 
motion to set aside the detault judgment, Mr. Spriggs testified 
that he took the summons and complaint to the Weenig home, rang 
the doorbell, and had a conversation with an unseen, unnamed 
person over an intercom system who allegedly identified herself 
as the appellant's daughter (R. 161). After describing several 
minutes of conversation during which the unseen person contin-
ued to refuse to identify herself by name ana declined to open 
the door, Mr. Spriggs testified: 
After about 10 minutes of this going on, 1 
got upset and told the person that I was 
going to fill a summons and complaint out 
ano leave Ft on the porch, and they TsicJ 
said that they [sicj did not have to accept 
it and I just said, you are served. And I 
left. 
(R. 161, emphasis added). 
-4-
Less than one page l a t e r , Mr. Spriggs contradicted h i s 
e a r l i e r test imony: 
Q Was there any commu neat ions with you 
and the person behind the door as to 
what the papers were tiiat you had for 
Mrs. Weenig? 
A No. I just sa id they were l e g a l 
papers , and I d idn' t t e l l them t h a t , 
you know, i t was a warrant or summons 
or anything . I just sa id I have some 
l e g a l papers that 1 had to d e l i v e r . 
(R. 162 , emphasis added). 
Mrs. Weenig and her two daughters also testified at 
the hearing. Mrs. Weenig testified that she had never been 
served with any papers in the case (R. 136, 140-41), and her 
daughters testified that they had never received papers and had 
never gone through the experience described by the constable 
(R. 142-45). 
Plaintiff filed an amenoea complaint on August 29, 
1979, naming not only Harry M. Weenig and Erma P. Weenig, but 
also the Lockhart Company and Prudential Federal Savings and 
Loan Association, as defendants (k. 15-20). That complaint was 
served upon the finance company defendants, but no service was 
even attempted on appellant (R. 24-28). All of the defendants, 
except appellant, concedea to having received process and 
entered appearances. 
A default judgment was entered against Mrs. Weenig on 
February 6, 1980, pursuant to a minute entry of the Honorable 
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Homer F. Wilkinson, Third District Court Judge (R. 36). The 
judgment declared void the quitclaim aeed between the Weenigs 
and "granted a Writ of Execution upon the property so conveyed" 
(R. 37). 
The plaintiff made no attempt to enforce this judgment 
until the Spring of 1984. Appellant, on the 17th day of April, 
1984, filed a motion to set aside the aefault juogment (R. 66), 
declaring in an affidavit that she first learned of the judg-
ment taken against her in her absence on April 11, 1984, when a 
praecipe was taped to the window of her home informing her that 
her home was to be sola at a Sheriff's Sale less than a month 
later. (R. 56 & 62-63.) The praecipe captioned the case in 
controversy as Mark Wbod vs. Harry M. Weenig. No other defen-
dants were listed (R. 56). 
The motion to set aside came before the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Fredrick presiding, on May 2, 1984. After hearing the testi-
mony of the parties and examining the exhibits introduced into 
evidence, the court denied the motion (R. 175-76). This appeal 
followed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN LIGHT OF THE RECOG-
NIZED POLICY IN FAVOR OF GRANTING SUCH MOTIONS. 
This Court has long recognized the general policy that 
•'courts should be liberal in granting relief against judgments 
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taken by default to the end that controversies may be tried on 
the merits.M Mason v. Mason, 597 P.2d 1322, 1323 (Utah 1979). 
Although this Court has also noted that the decision whether to 
grant a motion to set aside is left to the discretion of the 
trial court# see Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v» Parker, 30 Utah 
2d 65# 67-68, 513 P.2d 429 (1973), appellant contends that the 
trial court gave insufficient weight to this presumption in 
favor of setting aside default judgments and, consequently, 
abused its discretion. Indeed, appellant contends that the 
trial court's decision on tne service of process issue was 
erroneous as a matter of law. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SERVICE 
OF PROCESS. 
In Utah State Department of Social Services v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983), this Court held that 
In order for [a] defendant to be 
relieved from [a] default judgment, he must 
not only show that the judgment was entered 
against him through excusable neglect (or 
any other reason specified in Rule 60(b)), 
but he must also show that his motion to set 
aside the judgment was timely, and that he 
has a meritorious defense to the action. 
Id. at 1055-56. The trial judge in the case at bar concluded 
that appellant had failed to establish the elements articulated 
in Musselman (R. 175-76). Indeed, in the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law prepared by plaintiff-respondent's attorney 
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and adopted by the district court, that court concluded that 
appellant's motion to set aside was untimely as a matter of 
law, that appellant had failed to raise a meritorious defense, 
and that, as a matter ot law, service ot process was proper (R. 
116-117 )• These conclusions of law are erroneous. 
Initially, it is necessary to recognize that, pre-
suming the invalidity of service of process, appellant's 
apparent untimeliness under Rule 4 and her alleged failure to 
raise a meritorious defense before the trial court are irrele-
vant. If service of process was not properly effectuated, the 
trial court failed to obtain jurisdiction over appellant and 
any judgment rendered below is, of necessity, void. This court 
so held in Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 
(1971 )• In Murdock the court held void a judgment entered 
against a corporation on the grounds that process was not 
properly served upon the corporation's designated agent. Id. 
at 166-167. The Court found it irrelevant that the corporation 
may have had actual knowledge of the suit against it, stating: 
Service of summons in conformance with 
the mode prescribed by statute is deemed 
jurisdictional, for it is service of pro-
cess, not actual knowledge ot the commence-
ment of the action, which confers jurisdic-
tion. . . . The proper issuance anu service 
of summons is the means of invoking the 
jurisdiction of the court and acquiring 
jurisdiction over the defendant; these can-
not be supplanted by mere notice by letter, 
telephone or any other such means. 
Id at 167. 
An p f a aip 1 v vi I t he app 1 i ca 11 un o f t h i s concept — tha t 
the other two elements of the Musselman standard are i rre l evant 
i f process was not properly served - - i s found in t h i s Court's 
decis ion :i i : Woody v Rhodes
 l( 23 Utah 2d 249 , 461 P.2d 465 
(1969) , In that c a s e , the Court upheld the t r i a l cour t ' s 
dec is ion s e t t i n g as ide a judgment by default despite the fact 
tha t the mo t i on to s e t a s i de wa s no t f :i ] e d u n t i I o ve i: 
a f t e r the entry of tine default judgment. The Court s t a t e d : 
I t i s the p l a i n t i f f ' s contention here that 
the prov i s ions of Rule 6 0 ( b ) , Utah Rules of 
C i v i l Procedure, required that the defendant 
f i l e h i s motion within a period of not more 
than three months a f t er entry of the judg-
ment. I t i s quite apparent in t h i s case 
that the fac ts show an i n v a l i d s e r v i c e of 
summons. . • . The serv ice of summons being 
f a t a l l y d e f e c t i v e , the judgment entered pur-
suant thereto i s without force or e f f e c t ana 
the court acted properly in s e t t i n g i t 
a s i d e . The three-months provis ion provided 
for in Rule 60(b) has no app l i ca t ion to t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n . 
Id . a t 466 See a l s o Stai i Ka tz Real Esta te , Inc , v . Chavez , 
565 P.2d 1142, 1143 n.2 (Utah 1977) . 
Waiver of: the t imel iness requirement in th i s c a s e , in 
a ddi t i on to be i ng lega11y compe11ed un < ier Woo dy v. Rho de s , is 
warranted on equi table grounds. KB noted above, p l a i n t i f f 
delayed over four years in attempting to execute the default 
judgment lit/ had obtained. Appellant tei,i.Ll t ied that she did not 
learn of the defaul t judgment u n t i l n o t i c e was given of the 
S h e r i f f ' s s a l e . Her motion to s e t as ide the judgment was f i l e d 
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six days later. The law can hardly require clairvoyance of 
defendants who are never served and against whom execution of 
judgment is not sought within the three-month period. See, 
e.g. , Tonelson v. Haines, 2 Ariz. App. 127, 406 P.2d 845, 846 
(1965) (delay in filing Rule 60(b) motion to set aside excused 
when plaintiff maae no effort to execute tne juagment until 
more than six months thereafter). 
It is clear that if appellant is successful in pre-
vailing on her contention that service of process was never 
made upon her within the meaning of Rule 4, the default judg-
ment entered against her must be vacated and appellant must be 
given a chance to pursue her defenses on the merits, regardless 
of the untimeliness of her motion or her alleged failure to 
assert a meritorious defense before the trial court. Service 
of process was not properly made in this case. 
Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that: 
Personal service within the state shall be 
as follows: 
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of 14 
years or over, by delivering a copy 
thereof to him personally, or by leav-
ing such a copy at his usual place of 
abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion there residing; or by 
delivering a copy to an agent autho-
rized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process. 
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Appellant submits t h a t , as a matter of law
 # no v a l i d s erv i ce of 
p rocess wri.% III.I c.r apon her even assuming the substant ive v a l i d -
i t y of the c o n s t a b l e ' s test imony. 
The cases c i t e d by p l a i n t i f f in the t r i a l cour t , Busi-
ness and P r o f e s s i o n a l Adjustment Co. v . Baker, 62 Or. App. 237, 
659 P.2d 1025 (1983 ) , and United P a c i f i c Insurance Co. v . D i s -
count Co. , lLi Wash. App,. 559, 550 P.2d 699 (1976) , are c l e a r l y 
d i s t ingui shable from the east-' a t bai . In Bakei
 t a deputy 
s h e r i f f approached the defendant's residence in order to serve 
process upon him, knocked on the oo< i and , there being 
response , c a l l e d the defendant s name. A voice from within the 
house, which the s h e r i f f recognized to be the voice of the 
detendant as a r e s u l t of an interview he had with the defendant 
e a r l i e r , responded "ao awav. leave me dI o n e . " The deputy 
immediately announced „-• voice that the defendant had 
been served and p l a c e t ;.* papers between the door and the door 
jam of the re s idence . JLd. of 1026, c a s e , c o n v e r s e l y , 
the c o n s t a b l e ' s a l l e g e d conversation occurred with an unnamed 
and unrecognized meiuner *»! the household, concededly not the 
defendant h e r s e l f . The constable merely l e f t Uie papers on I'.tie 
front porcn, not f ixed to the door or under anything that would 
prevent the pape r s from being nlown away or destroyed. See i d . 
a t 1027, (R. 166) . 
The United P a c i f i c Insurance case Is s imi lar ly 
d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . In United P a c i f i c Insurance the process 
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server went to the defendant's house and saw the defendant face 
to face . When the defendant learned of the process s erver ' s 
i d e n t i t y and purpose
 # she slammed the door in the s erver ' s 
f a c e , knocking the papers from h i s hand. The server y e l l e d to 
defendant that she had been l e g a l l y served and l e f t the papers 
on the porch, j[d. a t 700. This case i s again d i s t inguisnable 
from the case a t bar in that the server deal t with the defen-
dant herself;# not another person. In a d d i t i o n , the process 
server had v i s u a l l y i d e n t i f i e d the person witn whom he d e a l t , 
and knew of a surety that the defendant was in tne v i c i n i t y 
when he declared that she had been l e g a l l y served. 
The importance of the i d e n t i f i e a d i s t i n c t i o n s between 
the cases c i t e d by p l a i n t i f f in the t r i a l court and the case a t 
bar i s demonstrated by examining an analogous case from the 
Court of Appeals of Arizona — Tonelson v* Haines , 2 Ar iz . App. 
127, 406 P.2d 845 (1965) . In that c a s e , the process server 
t e s t i f i e d that he went to the defendant's home ana conversed 
with the defendant's w i f e . He claimed that when he informed 
the woman of h i s purpose she slammed the door in h i s face . As 
the door was being c lo sed in h i s face , "the process server 
t e s t i f i e d that . . . he s t a t e d in a normal tone of v o i c e , 
•Lady, you have been s erved , ' that he l e f t the summons anc 
complaint between the wooden door and the screen door of the 
home; and that thereafter he went on h i s way without not ic ing 
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where the papers l a y . " I j | . a t 846, The defendant's wife 
t e s t i f i e d before the t r i a l court that she was unaware dt the 
time of the inc ident that sei v,ice was being attempted or that 
the summons and complaint had been l e f t on the doorstep. Id* 
The Court of Appeals of Arizona upheld the t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i -
s ion s e t t i n g as ide the default judgment , ^9 • 1* "in order 
for there to be a ' leaving , with * person a 
c of the summons and complaint s required by Rule 
4 £ ( e ) ] f . « such person must line aware ot tue ' l e a v i n g . ' " Id. 
a t 847. 
Tl ie Ari zona c o u r t « s reasoning should control t h i s 
c a s e . Indeed, the fac t s in the Arizona !case provide ri much 
stronger b a s i s for n conclusion that the person served was 
aware ol l.ht» pa pert* being lel't than the fac t s at bar In 
Tonelson the process server viewed the person with whom service 
was l e f t face to face . The woman undoubtedly saw the papers in 
the s e r v e r ' s hand, and must have been within hearing distance 
a t the time he dec lared, "Lady, you have been served." In 
a d d i t i o n , the server placed the papers between the screen and 
the door, not loose on t he porch wht-'ie they could be blown 
away. I^ d. at; 84b,,, The occupant o l the defendant's home on the 
day i11 quest ion had much l e s s opportunity * * that the 
papers ha b»^n l e f t than . > 1 * d f e in 
Tonelson. Constable Spriggs never saw the person with whom he 
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allegedly left the papers. He had no way of knowing whether 
the occupant was within hearing distance when he became 
frustrated, announced his conclusion that in his mind legal 
service had been made, and left tne premises. Indeed, depend-
ing on which version of the constable's story one believes (see 
supra, pp. 4-5), it is not clear whether the occupant would 
have been aware that a summons and complaint were left even if 
she had been within hearing distance. It is uncon trover ted 
that the papers were simply left on the porch, not put inside 
the door or underneath a mat (R. 166). 
The key element of Rule 4(e), as interpreted by the 
Arizona court, "that the person 'with' whom the papers are left 
must have knowledge that the papers are so left,11 Ijd. at 847, 
has not been estaDlished in this case. Indeed, no finding of 
fact was made on this issue by the trial court. The case 
snould at least be remanded to the trial court to make such a 
finding. 
CONCLUSION 
This court must vacate the default judgment entered 
against the appellant in the court below. Where a judgment has 
been taken upon invalid service, the court has never acquired 
jurisdiction, and a valid judgment cannot be entered. Accord-
ingly, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set 
-14-
aside the default judgment entered against Mrs. Weenig in this 
case* 
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